Sustainability and internationalization are considered to be core values of Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), but their relationship is rarely investigated. The current study develops a framework to create a sustainable internationalization policy for an HEI; it analyzes how to measure the sustainability of an internationalization policy in two steps. First, this study presents a theoretical framework for a cost-benefit analysis of HEIs’ sustainable internationalization policies using three sustainability pillars (economic, ecological, and social), each with examples for their own measurable indicators. (...) Second, this research operationalizes the economic pillar of the framework to enable a specific measurement of the economic sustainability of internationalization. The empirical analysis identifies the distribution of funding for internationalization as a promising indicator. To demonstrate the implementation of this part of the framework, this study analyzes how German HEIs distribute their monetary investments in internationalization activities to countries worldwide. Using data from the German academic exchange service (DAAD), this research investigates the distribution using descriptive statistics. In a second step, the methodology of the Lorenz curve is empirically applied to the distribution of funding. Universität Hamburg is used as a case study to visualize the different funding tendencies among German HEIs. The findings suggest that the distribution of resources for internationalization says more about the sustainable character of an HEI than the absolute amount of invested resources. To evaluate the sustainability of an HEI’s internationalization strategy, it is therefore necessary to look at the distribution of target countries in addition to the mere absolute level of funding. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to demonstrate a problem with two medieval European views of existence: The property view and the essence view. Adopting a style of reasoning employed by the Indian Madhyamaka philosopher Nāgārjuna, I argue that both the property view and the essence view understand the relation between an object and its existence in terms of difference: The former understands the difference as the difference between an object and its property of existence, and the latter, as the difference (...) between an object’s essence and existence. Neither understanding is without problems, and both lack explanatory power. We must reject both the views. (shrink)

The central focus of this paper is to motivate and explore the question, when is it permissible to endorse a psychologizing explanation of a sincere interlocutor? I am interested in the moral question of when (if ever) we may permissibly dismiss the sincere reasons given to us by others, and instead endorse an alternative explanation of their beliefs and actions. I argue that there is a significant risk of wronging the other person, and so we should only psychologize when we (...) are in a position to know that they are in bad faith. (shrink)

Semantychnyĭ prostir movy -- Odvichni zapytanni︠a︡ -- Pereklady. Martin Haĭdegger. Hans Georg Gadamer. Gabrielʹ Marselʹ.

Originally published in 1952, this book forms the second of two volumes based on the Gifford Lectures delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 1919 and 1921. The first volume, Mind and Matter, was originally published in 1931. The text provides a philosophical discussion of the nature and limits of knowledge, examining the relationship between mind and the conception of a universal truth. Essential to this discussion is the idea of the part as being inconceivable in the absence of a (...) totalising wholeness of being. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy, psychology and theories of knowledge. (shrink)

This essay is a logico?philosophical critique of the Marxian system of sociology with special reference to the theory of social change. To every change in the natural order (taken in conjunction with the technological order) corresponds an appropriate change in the human order, that is, in the system of social relations. This, it is shown, is the fundamental Marxian thesis regarding social equilibrium. And accordingly the key idea regarding social change is that a gradually maturing inherent disproportion between the two (...) orders is the basic condition of social change, eventually leading to the establishment of a new social equilibrium at a higher level. A close examination of the concept of mode of production and changes therein is attempted in the course of elucidating the above thesis. It is argued that the technological interpretation of the concept of mode of production conflicts with the Marxian anthropology and that we should have a structural interpretation according to which it will refer to the economy as a whole and will include among other elements production relations. This interpretation leads the discussion into one of the central problems of Marxism, namely, the relation between the mode of production and the social system. It is argued that the social system is basic to Marx and after a close analysis of the concept of system it is shown that the Marxian theory of base and superstructure rests mainly on confusion of conceptual orientations. This, it is shown, is connected with a fundamental idea of Marxism, viz., that of a system without a transcendent centre. This essay endeavours to prove that such an idea is logically untenable. Hence the Marxian Laws of Transformation of Quantity into Quality and Negation of Negation are examined and shown logically untenable. The last section discusses the question about the determinant of technological change and eventually of social change. Three possible Marxian solutions are examined: (a) in terms of needs ? it is argued that this is inconsistent with Marx's theory of man and labour; (b) in terms of science and new ideas ? it is shown that this ultimately goes contrary to Marxian materialism and positivism; and finally, (c) the systemic solution in terms of the dialectic of nature and man is subjected to logical scrutiny and it is shown that this cannot be consistent and valid without involving a trans?historical standpoint; for, it is argued, the idea of the self?directing Humanity on which it rests is a self?contradictory notion. (shrink)